

# Lecture 35: Electronic Voting

# Announcements

- Homework 3B
- Project 3


# Detection

# Security Goals for an Election

- Integrity: no election fraud
- Transparency: Everyone – especially the loser – must be able to verify that the election was conducted appropriately
- Privacy: No one learns how the voter has voted
- Secret ballot: Voter cannot prove how she voted



ABSENT VOTER BALLOT  
STUB A No. 7720




STUB B No. 7720  
ABSENT VOTER BALLOT

**IMPORTANT  
DO NOT  
DETACH STUB**


.	.	39	.	.	115	.	191	.
1	20	.	58	77	96	134	153	210
.	.	40	.	.	116	.	172	.
2	.	59	78	.	135	154	192	211
.	21	.	.	97	.	173	.	.
.	.	41	.	.	117	.	193	.
3	.	60	79	.	136	155	194	212
.	22	.	.	98	.	174	.	.
.	.	42	.	.	118	.	195	213
4	.	61	80	.	137	156	196	.
.	23	.	.	99	.	175	.	.
.	.	43	.	.	119	.	197	214
5	.	62	81	.	138	157	198	.
.	24	.	.	100	.	176	.	.
.	.	44	.	.	120	.	199	215
6	.	63	82	.	139	158	200	.
.	25	.	.	101	.	177	.	.
.	.	45	.	.	121	.	201	216
7	.	64	83	.	140	159	202	.
.	26	.	.	102	.	178	.	.
.	.	46	.	.	122	.	203	217
8	.	65	84	.	141	160	204	.
.	27	.	.	103	.	179	.	.
.	.	47	.	.	123	.	205	218
9	.	66	85	.	142	161	206	.
.	28	.	.	104	.	180	.	.
.	.	48	.	.	124	.	207	219
10	.	67	86	.	143	162	208	.
.	29	.	.	105	.	181	.	.
.	.	49	.	.	125	.	209	220
11	.	68	87	.	144	163	210	.
.	30	.	.	106	.	182	.	.
.	.	50	.	.	126	.	211	221
12	.	69	88	.	145	164	212	.
.	31	.	.	107	.	183	.	.
.	.	51	.	.	127	.	213	222
13	.	70	89	.	146	165	214	.
.	32	.	.	108	.	184	.	.
.	.	52	.	.	128	.	215	223
14	.	71	90	.	147	166	216	.
.	33	.	.	109	.	185	.	.
.	.	53	.	.	129	.	217	224
15	.	72	91	.	148	167	218	.
.	34	.	.	110	.	186	.	.
.	.	54	.	.	130	.	219	225
16	.	73	92	.	149	168	220	.
.	35	.	.	111	.	187	.	.
.	.	55	.	.	131	.	221	226
17	.	74	93	.	150	169	222	.
.	36	.	.	112	.	188	.	.
.	.	56	.	.	132	.	223	227
18	.	75	94	.	151	170	224	.
.	37	.	.	113	.	189	.	.
.	.	57	.	.	133	.	225	228
19	.	76	95	.	152	171	226	.
.	38	.	.	114	.	190	.	.

TO BE FILLED IN BY ELECTION BOARD ONLY  
PRECINCT NO. WRITE-IN NO.











# Confusion at Palm Beach County polls

Some Al Gore supporters may have mistakenly voted for Pat Buchanan because of the ballot's design.

Although the Democrats are listed second in the column on the left, they are the third hole on the ballot.

Punching the second hole casts a vote for the Reform party.

ELECTORS FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT	
(REPUBLICAN)	3 →
GEORGE W. BUSH - PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY - VICE PRESIDENT	
(DEMOCRATIC)	5 →
AL GORE - PRESIDENT JOE LIEBERMAN - VICE PRESIDENT	
(LIBERTARIAN)	7 →
HARRY BROWNE - PRESIDENT ART OLIVIER - VICE PRESIDENT	
(GREEN)	9 →
RALPH NADER - PRESIDENT WINONA LA DUKE - VICE PRESIDENT	
(SOCIALIST WORKERS)	11 →
JAMES HARRIS - PRESIDENT MARGARET TROWE - VICE PRESIDENT	
(NATURAL LAW)	13 →
JOHN HAGELIN - PRESIDENT NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT	

(A vote for the candidates will actually be a vote for their electors.)  
(Vote for Group)

(REFORM)	← 4
PAT BUCHANAN - PRESIDENT EZOLA FOSTER - VICE PRESIDENT	
(SOCIALIST)	← 6
DAVID McREYNOLDS - PRESIDENT MARY CAL HOLLIS - VICE PRESIDENT	
(CONSTITUTION)	← 8
HOWARD PHILLIPS - PRESIDENT J. CURTIS FRAZIER - VICE PRESIDENT	
(WORKERS WORLD)	← 10
MONICA MOOREHEAD - PRESIDENT GLORIA LA RIVA - VICE PRESIDENT	
WRITE-IN CANDIDATE To vote for a write-in candidate, follow the directions on the long stub of your ballot card.	



# Another Anomaly During the 2000 Election

From: Lana Hires

Subject: 2000 November Election

I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the County.

I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was uploaded. Will someone please explain this so that I have the information to give the auditor instead of standing here "looking dumb".







## Summary Ballot Instructions

Press the candidate name or contest title to return to a contest.

Vote button will light up when you may cast your ballot.

Press here to cast your ballot now

### Best Automobile Manufacturer Vote For ONE



FORD

### Best Vocal Artist (Vote for Not More Than TWO)



FA

No selection made.

### Best Ice-Cream Flavor Vote For ONE

No selection made.

### Proposition 1

No selection made.

### Proposition 2

No selection made.



Back

01 / 01



# Security Requirements for Electronic Voting Machines

- Machine must allow each authorized voter to vote exactly once; must prevent tampering with votes after they are cast.
- Machine should be verifiably trustworthy.
- Machine must randomize the order in which votes were cast.
- Machine must not give voter a “receipt”.




# Early use of DREs

- Nov 4, 2002: State of Georgia votes on Diebold DREs.
- March 18, 2003: Diebold source code leaks.
- July 23, 2003: Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Avi Rubin, Dan Wallach, “Analysis of an Electronic Voting System”.

# Diebold's Voter Authorization Protocol



(record vote)



QueryStatus [Are you a valid card?]

ACTIVE (0x01) [Yup.]

[Please cancel yourself.]  
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Status = CANCELED

Succeeded [Ok.]




# Attack



QueryStatus [Are you a valid card?]  
ACTIVE (0x01) [Yup.]

(record vote)



[Please cancel yourself.]  
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)  
Succeeded [Sure, whatever you say.]

QueryStatus [Are you a valid card?]  
ACTIVE (0x01) [Yup. Still valid. Nothing suspicious here.]

(record another vote)



# Authenticating Election Officials

What kind of card are you?

An administrator card.

What's the secret PIN?

2301



What's the secret PIN?

2301

Ok, you have admin access.









**TOUCH**

**YOU MAY CHANGE**

your vote by touching the same selection again. The candidate is unselected and all circles for the contest appear again.

**WRITE-IN**

the name of a qualified candidate by touching WRITE-IN on the candidate list. When the on screen keyboard appears, key in the candidate's name. Then touch OK. The write-in candidate's name now appears on the list of candidates.

**CONTINUE**

on the following page by touching NEXT on the bottom right of the screen. To return to the previous page, touch BACK on the bottom left of the screen.

**REVIEW**

a summary of all your votes on the screen. To make a change, touch the circle or name to return to the ballot page for that race.

**COMPLETE**

by touching the yellow screen. Your ballot is now cast!

# PAC-MAN

LAP  
20760

HIGH SCORE  
20710

PAC-MAN on the Sega/AVC Edge DRE voting machine

Press [Start] to Begin [1-Player] or [2-Player] [ESC] to Quit



# **Machine error gives Bush 3,893 extra votes in Ohio**

By John McCarthy, Associated Press

COLUMBUS, Ohio — An error with an electronic voting system gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus, elections officials said.

Franklin County's unofficial results had Bush receiving 4,258 votes to Democrat John Kerry's 260 votes in a precinct in Gahanna. Records show only 638 voters cast ballots in that precinct. Bush's total should have been recorded as 365.

# Fall 2003, Ohio

"I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president."

-- Wally O'Dell



CEO of Diebold







# California Top-to-Bottom Review

- In 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen commissions a review of California's voting systems.
- 43 experts (led by David Wagner & Matt Bishop) examine voting systems used nationally.





# Findings of the TTBR

- All voting systems were vulnerable to viral attacks: one outsider could subvert all voting machines countywide

# Example Flaw: Diebold/Premier Systems

- Bug: The code that reads data off the memory card has buffer overrun vulnerabilities.
- Attack:
  - Attacker writes malicious code onto a memory card
  - When central PC reads votes off card on election night, it gets infected
  - Infected PC writes malicious code onto all cards used in the next election, infecting entire county



# Result of TTBR

- Bowen decertifies most touchscreen e-voting machines and imposes strict new procedural protections.
- Most Californians now vote on paper ballots.

[illegible]

# Backdoors and the Insider Threat



Ronald Dale Harris

Employee, Gaming Control Board, 1983-1995

Arrested, Jan 15, 1995

Convicted, Sept 23, 1997, for rigging slot machines



# Attempted Back Door in Linux Kernel

```
...  
    schedule();  
    goto repeat;  
}  
if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && current->uid = 0))  
    retval = -EINVAL;  
retval = -ECHILD;  
end_wait4:  
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;  
...
```



# Defense Against Backdoors in Voting Machines

- Malicious logic hidden by an insider might, e.g., record votes incorrectly to favor one candidate. How would we defend a voting system against this kind of insider threat?
- Potential solutions:
  - Verify that the software is free of Trojans and will work correctly on all future elections. (beyond the state of the art)
  - Assume software might contain Trojans. Verify that software worked correctly in this particular election. (voter-verified paper records + random audits)







# SAMPLE BALLOT

<b>N.C. STATE SENATE DISTRICT 25</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> WILLIAM R. (BILL) PURCELL DEM <input type="radio"/> _____	<b>DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> HUNT GWYN	<b>AMENDMENT II</b> Constitutional amendment to provide that the General Assembly may place the clear proceeds of civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and civil fines collected by a State agency in a State fund to be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools. <input type="radio"/> FOR <input type="radio"/> AGAINST
<b>N.C. STATE HOUSE DISTRICT 69</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> PRYOR GIBSON DEM <input type="radio"/> HILDA L. MORTON REP	<b>DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> LISA BLUE THACKER	
<b>REGISTER OF DEEDS</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> JOANNE S. HUNTLEY DEM	<b>DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> TANYA WALLACE	<b>AMENDMENT III</b> Constitutional amendment to provide for the first term of office for magistrates of the General Court of Justice to be two years and for subsequent terms to be four years. <input type="radio"/> FOR <input type="radio"/> AGAINST
<b>NON PARTISAN OFFICES</b> Non partisan offices are not included in Straight Party voting and must be voted separately to be counted.	<b>DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> W. DAVID McSHEEHAN <input type="radio"/> JOSEPH J. WILLIAMS	
<b>ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> SARAH PARKER <input type="radio"/> JOHN M. TYSON	<b>NON PARTISAN OFFICES</b> Additional instructions to Voter If you wish to write in a name for any of the following offices, write the name in the blank space provided and completely fill in the oval to the left of the name in order for your vote to count.	
<b>ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> RONNIE ANSLEY <input type="radio"/> RACHEL LEA HUNTER <input type="radio"/> HOWARD E. MANNING, JR. <input type="radio"/> BETSY McCRODDEN <input type="radio"/> FRED MORRISON, JR. <input type="radio"/> PAUL MARTIN NEWBY <input type="radio"/> MARVIN SCHILLER <input type="radio"/> JAMES A. WYNN, JR.	<b>BROWN CREEK SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT SUPERVISOR</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> JOHN C. SPRINGER <input type="radio"/> _____	
	<b>STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS</b>	
<b>JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> LINDA McGEE <input type="radio"/> BILL PARKER	<b>AMENDMENT I</b> Constitutional amendment to promote local economic and community development projects by (i) permitting the General Assembly to enact general laws giving counties, cities, and towns the power to finance public improvements associated with qualified private economic and community improvements within development districts, as long as the financing is secured by the additional tax revenues resulting from the enhanced property value within the development district and is not secured by a pledge of the local government's faith and credit or general taxing authority, which financing is not subject to a referendum; and (ii) permitting the owners of property in the development district to agree to a minimum tax value for their property, which is binding on future owners as long as the development district is in existence. <input type="radio"/> FOR <input type="radio"/> AGAINST	
<b>JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> WANDA G. BRYANT <input type="radio"/> ALICE C. STUBBS		
<b>JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> BARBARA JACKSON <input type="radio"/> ALAN THORNBURG		
<b>DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20</b> You may vote for ONE <input type="radio"/> CHRIS BRAGG	<b>TURN OVER TO CONTINUE VOTING</b>	






GRIP BELOW  DOTTED LINE





# Statistical Audit

- After election, randomly choose 1% of machines and manually recount the paper records on those machines. If paper count  $\neq$  electronic count, there was fraud.
- If  $\gg 100$  machines lie, detection is likely. Consequently: If paper count = electronic count, then likely no more than  $\sim 100$  machines lied.





# Conclusions: Electronic voting

- E-voting security is hard, but can be made secure and trustworthy, if it can be audited.

# Broader Takeaways

- Sometimes technical threats can be handled through non-technical defenses.
- Seek independent, end-to-end checks that the system is working properly.
- Securing systems against malicious insiders is extremely challenging.
- Business structure determines the technology that is built & deployed. If buyers cannot measure how secure a product is, be prepared for market failures.



# Extra Material

THE HAZARDS OF ONLINE VOTING...

