

Secure Channels

CS 161: Computer Security

Prof. Raluca Ada Popa

March 30, 2020

Announcements

- I will turn on recording in Zoom
- Please turn on video so I can see you
- Midterm 2 April 6 at 5pm PT
 - The exam will cover lectures from after midterm 1 (starting with hashing) until April 3rd
- Homework 3a, due Sunday, April 5, at 11:59pm PST
 - Mid-semester survey attached

Building A Secure End-to-End Channel: TLS

- TLS = *Transport Layer Security*
- Secure channel for applications that use TCP
 - Secure = encryption/confidentiality + integrity + authentication (of server, but *not* of client)
 - E.g., puts the 's' in "https"

Regular web surfing - http: URL

Amazon.com: Online Shopping for Electronics, Apparel, Computers, Books, DVDs & more

http://www.amazon.com/

Most Visited Latest Headlines NY Times Google News Daily Weather 294 United Traffic Papers US9 IMC CSET Google Maps RSS Movies

Amazon.com: Online Shopping for...

amazon.com

Hello. [Sign in](#) to get personalized recommendations. New customer? [Start here](#).

[Your Amazon.com](#) [Today's Deals](#) [Gifts & Wish Lists](#) [Gift Cards](#) [Your Account](#) [Help](#)

FREE 2-Day Shipping, No Minimum Purchase: [See details](#)

Shop All Departments

Books >

Movies, Music & Games >

Digital Downloads >

Kindle >

Computers & Office >

Electronics >

Home & Garden >

Grocery, Health & Beauty >

Toys, Kids & Baby >

Clothing, Shoes & Jewelry >

Sports & Outdoors >

Tools, Auto & Industrial >

Search All Departments GO Cart Wish List

Kindle

You'll Do a Double Take.
Reads Like Real Paper,
Even in Bright Sunlight.

[Shop now](#)

Learn more


What's your Pay Phrase? "Strategic Insight" is still available! [Claim yours](#)

Warm Your Feet in UGG

These twin-faced, breathable sheepskin [UGG](#) boots keep your feet warm and cozy at any time

Transferring data from spe.atdmt.com...

Web surfing with TLS - https: URL



The image shows a screenshot of a web browser displaying the Amazon.com website. The browser's address bar shows the URL `https://www.amazon.com/gp/css/homepage.html?ie=UTF8&ref_=topni`, with the `https://` portion circled in orange. An arrow points from the text 'Web surfing with TLS - https: URL' to this circled portion. The browser's title bar reads 'Amazon.com - Your Account'. The page content includes the Amazon logo (circled in orange), a search bar, and a 'Your Account' section. A text box on the right contains the following text:

Note: Amazon makes sure that all of these images, etc., are now **also** fetched via https: URLs.

Doing so gives the web page full integrity, in keeping with *end-to-end* security.

(Browsers do not provide this “promotion” automatically.)

RSA Encryption

We saw RSA in class as a digital signature scheme, but it can also be used as a public-key encryption algorithm:

- The encrypt algorithm is similar to the verify algorithm, and the decrypt similar to the sign algorithm
- Small differences: encrypt the message with special padding, instead of signing a hash of the message

HTTPS Connection (TLS)


1. Suppose a browser (client) connects to a server **which returns a certificate from a trusted CA**
2. Client browser and server will exchange symmetric keys using TLS
3. Then, they will send encrypted & authenticated traffic to each other

HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS)

- Browser (client) connects to Amazon's **HTTPS** server
- Client picks 256-bit random number R_B , sends over list of crypto algorithms it supports
- Server picks 256-bit random number R_S , selects algorithms to use for this session
- Server sends over its certificate with its PK_{Amazon}


(all of this is in the clear)

- **Client now validates cert**




HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS), cont.

- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends **PS** encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
- Using **PS**, R_B , and R_S , browser & server derive symm. *cipher* keys (C_B , C_S) & MAC *integrity* keys (I_B , I_S)
 - One pair to use in each direction



HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS), cont.

- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends **PS** encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
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
These seed a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).

Q: why R_B and R_S ?

A: prevents a replay attack, attacker captures handshake from either the client or server and replays it. Why not only one of them? You don't need to check for reuse by the other side... just make sure you don't reuse it on your side!

HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS), cont.


- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends PS encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
- Using PS, R_B , and R_S , browser & server derive symm. *cipher keys* (C_B , C_S) & MAC *integrity keys* (I_B , I_S)
 - One pair to use in each direction
- Browser & server exchange MACs computed over entire dialog so far




Q: Why?

A: So they know they have the same (C_B , C_S), (I_B , I_S)

HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS), cont.

- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends PS encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
- Using PS, R_B , and R_S , browser & server derive symm. *cipher keys* (C_B , C_S) & MAC *integrity keys* (I_B , I_S)
 - One pair to use in each direction
- Browser & server exchange MACs computed over entire dialog so far
- If good MAC, browser displays 



On Firefox:





On Chrome:



The communication before the green lock is called the SSL handshake; its purpose is to establish shared symmetric keys for secure communication.

HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS), cont.

- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends PS encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
- Using PS, R_B , and R_S , browser & server **PS** derive symm. *cipher keys* (C_B , C_S) & MAC *integrity keys* (I_B , I_S)
 - One pair to use in each direction
- Browser & server exchange MACs computed over entire dialog so far
- If good MAC, Browser displays 
- All subsequent communication encrypted w/ symmetric cipher (e.g., **AES128**) cipher keys in some agreed upon chaining mode, MACs
 - Sequence #'s included with every message to thwart **replay attacks**




Alternative: Key Exchange via Diffie-Hellman

- For Diffie-Hellman, server generates random a , sends public params and $g^a \bmod p$


Q: How can we prevent MITM?

A: Server signs $g^a \bmod p$ using SK_{Amazon} , browser verifies using PK_{Amazon} from server certificate



Alternative: Key Exchange via Diffie-Hellman

- For Diffie-Hellman, server generates random a , sends public params and $g^a \bmod p$
 - Signed with server's private key
- Browser verifies signature using PK from certificate
- Browser generates random b , computes $PS = g^{ab} \bmod p$, sends to server its public key
- Server also computes $PS = g^{ab} \bmod p$
- Remainder is as before: from PS , R_B , and R_S , browser & server derive symm. cipher keys (C_B , C_S) and MAC integrity keys (I_B , I_S), etc...




RSA versus Diffie-Hellman


- Forward secrecy: If attacker steals long term secret key of server, SK_{Amazon} , should not be able to read past conversations (cannot compromise past session keys (C_B, C_S) & (I_B, I_S))
- Why matters?
 - Attackers log traffic now. Compromise key in future and try to decrypt the traffic.
- TLS with RSA does not have forward secrecy
- TLS DH has forward secrecy

Exchange with RSA

Q: Forward secrecy?

A: No forward secrecy because attacker can decrypt PS and knows R_B , and R_S and computes secrets

- For RSA, browser constructs “Premaster Secret” **PS**
- Browser sends PS encrypted using Amazon’s public RSA key PK_{Amazon}
- Using PS, R_B , and R_S , browser & server derive symm. *cipher keys* (C_B , C_S) & MAC *integrity keys* (I_B , I_S)
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 - Sequence #'s thwart **replay attacks**




Q: Forward secrecy?
A: Has forward secrecy because shared secret never sent over the network! If attacker as SK_{Amazon} , cannot decrypt a.

-
- The diagram illustrates a secure communication protocol between a **Browser** (left) and an **Amazon Server** (right). The communication is mediated by a **PS** (Public Server) in the middle.
- The protocol steps are as follows:
- The **Amazon Server** sends a certificate to the **Browser**: "Here's my cert".
 - The **Amazon Server** sends a large block of data (~2-3 KB) to the **Browser**.
 - The **Amazon Server** sends a red arrow containing the tuple $\{g, p, g^a \bmod p\}$ and the server's secret key SK_{Amazon} to the **PS**.
 - The **PS** sends a blue arrow containing $g^b \bmod p$ to the **Amazon Server**.
 - The **PS** sends a blue arrow containing the MAC $MAC(dialog, I_B)$ to the **Amazon Server**.
 - The **PS** sends a red arrow containing the MAC $MAC(dialog, I_S)$ to the **Browser**.
 - The **PS** sends a blue arrow containing the tuple $\{M_1, MAC(M_1, I_B)\}_{CB}$ to the **Amazon Server**.
- The diagram also includes a green padlock icon on the left and a vertical ellipsis at the bottom, indicating further communication or a secure channel.

HTTPS Connection (SSL / TLS)

- Browser (client) connects via TCP to Amazon's **HTTPS** server
- Client picks 256-bit random number R_B , sends over list of crypto protocols it supports
- Server picks 256-bit random number R_S , selects protocols to use for this session
- Server sends over its certificate
- (all of this is in the clear)
- **Client now validates cert**



Certificates

- Browser compares domain *name* in cert w/ URL
 - Note: this provides an **end-to-end property** (as opposed to say a cert associated with an IP address)
- Browser accesses separate cert belonging to issuer or **CA**
 - These are **hardwired into the browser** – and **trusted!**
- Browser applies CA's public key to verify signature **S**, obtaining hash of what CA signed
 - Compares with its own **SHA-256** hash of Amazon's cert
- Assuming hashes match, now have high confidence it's indeed Amazon with that PK...
 - ***assuming signatory is trustworthy*** = assuming didn't lose private key; assuming didn't sign thoughtlessly

End-to-End \Rightarrow Powerful Protections

- Attacker runs a sniffer to capture our WiFi session?
 - (maybe by breaking crummy WEP security)
 - **But:** encrypted communication is unreadable
 - No problem!
- DNS cache poisoning gives client wrong IP address
 - Client goes to wrong server
 - **But:** certificate won't match
 - No problem!
- Attacker hijacks our connection, injects new traffic
 - **But:** data receiver rejects it due to failed integrity check
 - No problem!

Powerful Protections, cont.

- Attacker manipulates routing to run us by an eavesdropper or take us to the wrong server?
 - **But:** they can't read; we detect impersonation
 - **No problem!**
- Attacker slips in as a Man In The Middle?
 - **But:** they can't read, they can't inject
 - They can't even replay previous encrypted traffic
 - **No problem!**

Validating Amazon's Identity, cont.

- Browser retrieves cert belonging to the **issuer**
 - These are hardwired into the browser – and **trusted!**
- What if browser can't find a cert for the issuer?



This Connection is Untrusted

You have asked Firefox to connect securely to **www.mikestoolbox.org**, but we can't confirm that your connection is secure.

Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.

What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that someone is trying to impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

Get me out of here!


▼ Technical Details

www.mikestoolbox.org uses an invalid security certificate.

The certificate is not trusted because the issuer certificate is not trusted.

(Error code: sec_error_untrusted_issuer)

► I Understand the Risks



Validating Amazon's Identity, cont.

- Browser retrieves cert belonging to the **issuer**
 - These are hardwired into the browser – and **trusted!**
- What if browser can't find a cert for the issuer?
- If it can't find the cert, then warns the user that site has not been verified
 - Can still proceed, just **without authentication**
- Q: Which end-to-end security properties do we lose if we incorrectly trust that the site is whom we think?
- A: **All of them!**
 - Goodbye confidentiality, integrity, authentication
 - Man in the middle attacker can read everything, modify, impersonate

SSL / TLS Limitations

- Properly used, SSL / TLS provides powerful end-to-end protections
- Used by many sites, reasons why not all sites:
 - Cost of public-key crypto (fairly minor)
 - o Takes non-trivial CPU processing (but today a minor issue)
 - o Note: *symmetric* key crypto on modern hardware is non-issue
 - Hassle of buying/maintaining certs (Let's Encrypt addresses it)
 - Integrating with other sites that don't use HTTPS
 - Latency: extra round trips \Rightarrow 1st page slower to load
 - Cannot cache encrypted pages

SSL / TLS Limitations, cont.

- Problems that SSL / TLS does **not** take care of ?
- TCP-level **denial of service**
 - SYN flooding
 - RST injection
 - o (but does protect against data injection!)
- server-side coding/logic flaws
- Vulnerabilities introduced by server inconsistencies

Regular web surfing: http: URL

So *no integrity* - a MITM attacker can alter pages returned by server ...

And when we click here ...

... attacker has changed the corresponding link so that it's ordinary http rather than https!

We never get a chance to use TLS's protections! :-)

“sslstrip” attack

SSL / TLS Limitations, cont.

- Problems that SSL / TLS does **not** take care of ?
- server-side coding/logic flaws
- Vulnerabilities introduced by server inconsistencies
- Browser coding/logic flaws
- User flaws
 - Weak passwords
 - Phishing
- Issues of trust ...

TLS/SSL Trust Issues


- User has to make correct trust decisions ...



Recycle Bin

Welcome to eBay - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignInruhttpAFFwww.ebay.com2F/

Go Links >>

 eBay Buyer Protection [Learn more](#)

Welcome to eBay

Ready to bid and buy? Register here

Join the millions of people who are already a part of the eBay family. Don't worry, we have room for one more.

Register as an eBay Member and enjoy privileges including:

- Bid, buy and find bargains from all over the world
- Shop with confidence with PayPal Buyer Protection
- Connect with the eBay community and more!

[Register](#)

Sign in to your account

Back for more fun? Sign in now to buy, bid and sell, or to manage your account.

User ID [I forgot my user ID](#)Password [I forgot my password](#)

☐ Keep me signed in for today. Don't check this box if you're at a public or shared computer.

[Sign in](#)

Having problems with signing in? [Get help.](#)


Protect your account: Create a unique password by using a combination of letters and numbers that are not



Recycle Bin

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- Connect with the eBay community and more!

[Register](#)

Internet Explorer



When you send information to the Internet, it might be possible for others to see that information. Do you want to continue?

☒ In the future, do not show this message.

[Yes](#)[No](#)

Sign in to your account

Sign in now to buy, bid and sell, or to manage your account.

[I forgot my user ID](#)Password [I forgot my password](#)

☐ Keep me signed in for today. Don't check this box if you're at a public or shared computer.

[Sign in](#)

Having problems with signing in? [Get help.](#)

Protect your account: Create a unique password by using a combination of letters and numbers that are not


Internet



Recycle Bin

Identity Confirmation - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



Address http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignInruhttpAFFwww.ebay.com2F/sQuestion.php

Go

Links >>



Please confirm your identity

Please answer security question

Select your secret question...

Answer the secret question you provided.

What is your other eBay user ID or another's?

What email used to be associated with this account?

Have you ever sold something on eBay?

Security Alert 

Information you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's security certificate.



The security certificate was issued by a company you have not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether you want to trust the certifying authority.



The security certificate date is valid.



The security certificate has a valid name matching the name of the page you are trying to view.

Do you want to proceed?

Done

Internet

Identity Confirmation - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Home Search Favorites Refresh Print Mail

Address http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&url=http://www.ebay.com/35/c/question_eb... Go Links

ebay

Please confirm your identity

Please answer security question

Select your secret question... ▼

Answer the secret question you provided.

What is your other eBay user ID or another email address you used to register on eBay?

What email used to be associated with this account?


Have you ever sold something on eBay?

☐ No

☐ Yes

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

 **Certificate Information**

This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):

- Ensures the identity of a remote computer

* Refer to the certification authority's statement for details.

Issued to: rover.ebay.com

Issued by: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G3


Valid from: 10/22/2010 **to:** 12/1/2012

Install Certificate... Issuer Statement

OK

Identity Confirmation - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Address <http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignInruhttpAFFwww.ebay.com2F/sQuestion.php> Go Links

Please confirm your identity

Please answer security question

Select your secret question...

Answer the secret question you provided.

What is your other eBay user ID or another

What email used to be associated with this account

Have you ever sold something on eBay?

- ☐ No
☐ Yes

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Version	V3
Serial number	4d ab c9 a6 0a 30 20 57 f9 23 ...
Signature algorithm	sha1RSA
Issuer	VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server...
Valid from	Friday, October 22, 2010 4:00...
Valid to	Saturday, December 01, 2012...
Subject	rover.ebay.com, Site Operatio...
Public key	RSA (1024 Bits)

Edit Properties...


Copy to File...

OK

Internet

Identity Confirmation - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Address <http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignInruhttpAFFwww.ebay.com2F/sQuestion.php> Go Links

Please confirm your identity

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Answer the secret question you provided.

What is your other eBay user ID or another

What email used to be associated with this account

Have you ever sold something on eBay?

- ☐ No
☐ Yes

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Subject Alternative Name	DNS Name=rover.ebay.com, ...
Basic Constraints	Subject Type=End Entity, Pat...
Key Usage	Digital Signature, Key Encipher...
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr...
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy:Policy Ide...
Enhanced Key Usage	Server Authentication (1.3.6....
Authority Key Identifier	KeyID=0d 44 5c 16 53 44 c1 8...
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access: Acc...

Edit Properties...

Copy to File...

OK

Internet

Identity Confirmation - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Home Search Favorites Refresh Print Mail People

Address <http://0xbd5947e3/sendfiles/.../signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignInruhttpAFFwww.ebay.com2F/sQuestion.php> Go Links

ebay

Please confirm your identity

Please answer security question

Select your secret question... ▾

Answer the secret question you provided.

What is your other eBay user ID or another

What email used to be associated with this account

Have you ever sold something on eBay?

☐ No

☐ Yes

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Certification path

- VeriSign
 - VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G3
 - rover.ebay.com

View Certificate


Certificate status:

This certificate is OK.

OK

Internet

The equivalent as seen by most Internet users:



(note: an actual Windows error message!)

TLS/SSL Trust Issues, cont.

- “*Commercial certificate authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to take money.*”
 - Matt Blaze, circa 2001
- So how many CAs do we have to worry about, anyway?

Keychain Access



Click to lock the System Roots keychain.



Keychains



login



Micr...ertificates



System



System Roots

**A-Trust-Qual-02**

Root certificate authority

Expires: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 3:00:00 PM PT

✓ This certificate is valid

Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
A-CERT ADVANCED	certificate	Oct 23, 2011 7:14:14 AM	System Roots
A-Trust-nQual-01	certificate	Nov 30, 2014 3:00:00 PM	System Roots
A-Trust-nQual-03	certificate	Aug 17, 2015 3:00:00 PM	System Roots
A-Trust-Qual-01	certificate	Nov 30, 2014 3:00:00 PM	System Roots
A-Trust-Qual-02	certificate	Dec 2, 2014 3:00:00 PM	System Roots
AAA Certificate Services	certificate	Dec 31, 2028 3:59:59 PM	System Roots
AC Raíz Certicámara S.A.	certificate	Apr 2, 2030 2:42:02 PM	System Roots
AddTrust Class 1 CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 3:38:31 AM	System Roots
AddTrust External CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 3:48:38 AM	System Roots
AddTrust Public CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 3:41:50 AM	System Roots
AddTrust Qualified CA Root	certificate	May 30, 2020 3:44:50 AM	System Roots
Admin-Root-CA	certificate	Nov 9, 2021 11:51:07 PM	System Roots
AdminCA-CD-T01	certificate	Jan 25, 2016 4:36:19 AM	System Roots
AffirmTrust Commercial	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 6:06:06 AM	System Roots
AffirmTrust Networking	certificate	Dec 31, 2030 6:08:24 AM	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium	certificate	Dec 31, 2040 6:10:36 AM	System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium ECC	certificate	Dec 31, 2040 6:20:24 AM	System Roots
America Onli...ation Authority 1	certificate	Nov 19, 2037 12:43:00 PM	System Roots
America Onli...ation Authority 2	certificate	Sep 29, 2037 7:08:00 AM	System Roots
AOL Time W...cation Authority 1	certificate	Nov 20, 2037 7:03:00 AM	System Roots
AOL Time W...cation Authority 2	certificate	Sep 28, 2037 4:43:00 PM	System Roots
Apple Root CA	certificate	Feb 9, 2035 1:40:36 PM	System Roots
Apple Root Certificate Authority	certificate	Feb 9, 2025 4:18:14 PM	System Roots
Application CA G2	certificate	Mar 31, 2016 7:59:59 AM	System Roots
ApplicationCA	certificate	Dec 12, 2017 7:00:00 AM	System Roots



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167 items

TLS/SSL Trust Issues

- *“Commercial certificate authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to take money.”*
– Matt Blaze, circa 2001
- So how many CAs do we have to worry about, anyway?
- Of course, it's not just their greed that matters ...

Solo Iranian hacker takes credit for Comodo certificate attack

Security researchers split on whether 'ComodoHacker' is the real deal

By Gregg Keizer

March 27, 2011 08:39 PM ET

 [Comments \(5\)](#)  [Recommended \(37\)](#)

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Computerworld - A solo Iranian hacker on Saturday claimed responsibility for stealing multiple SSL certificates belonging to some of the Web's biggest sites, including Google, Microsoft, Skype and Yahoo.

Early reaction from security experts was mixed, with some believing the hacker's claim, while others were dubious.

Last week, conjecture had focused on a state-sponsored attack, perhaps funded or conducted by the Iranian government, that hacked a certificate reseller affiliated with U.S.-based Comodo.

On March 23, Comodo acknowledged the attack, saying that eight days earlier, hackers had obtained nine bogus certificates for the log-on sites of Microsoft's Hotmail, Google's Gmail, the Internet phone and chat service Skype and Yahoo Mail. A certificate for Mozilla's Firefox add-on site was also acquired.

Fraudulent Google certificate points to Internet attack

Is Iran behind a fraudulent Google.com digital certificate? The situation is similar to one that happened in March in which spoofed certificates were traced back to Iran.



by [Elinor Mills](#) | August 29, 2011 1:22 PM PDT



A Dutch company appears to have issued a digital certificate for Google.com to someone other than Google, who may be using it to try to re-direct traffic of users based in Iran.

Yesterday, someone reported on a Google support site that when attempting to log in to Gmail the browser issued a warning for the digital certificate used as proof that the site is legitimate, according to [this thread](#) on a Google support forum site.

October 31, 2012, 10:49AM

Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers

The attacker who penetrated the Dutch CA DigiNotar last year had complete control of all eight of the company's certificate-issuing servers during the operation and he may also have issued some rogue certificates that have not yet been identified. The final report from a

Evidence Suggests DigiNotar, Who Issued Fraudulent Google Certificate, Was Hacked *Years* Ago

from the *diginot* dept

The big news in the security world, obviously, is the fact that a **fraudulent Google certificate made its way out into the wild**, apparently targeting internet users in Iran. The Dutch company DigiNotar has put out a statement saying that **it discovered a breach** back on July 19th during a security audit, and that fraudulent certificates were generated for "several dozen" websites. The only one known to have gotten out into the wild is the Google one.

TLS/SSL Trust Issues

- *“Commercial certificate authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to take money.”*
– Matt Blaze, circa 2001
- So how many CAs do we have to worry about, anyway?
- Of course, it's not just their greed that matters ...
- ... and it's not just their diligence & security that matters ...
 - *“A decade ago, I observed that commercial certificate authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to take money. That turns out to be wrong; they don't even do that much.”* - Matt Blaze, circa 2010

Conclusion

- Use SSL/TLS to secure communications end-to-end
- Relies on trustworthiness of certificates, which does not always hold